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The concept of ‘fear of crime’ has been the subject 
of substantive international interest and debate since 
the 1960s.1 This attention was particularly motivated 
by the recognition that it is a salient social problem 
in its own right, with a notable share of citizens 
across many countries expressing worry about 
crime.2 It further reflects concern with the complex 
and detrimental effects that fear of criminal violence 
imparts on quality of life at individual, community and 
societal levels. As research evidence has amassed 
concerning the skewed spatial patterning of crime 
and the fear of crime across different localities 
both internationally and in South Africa,3 a growing 
academic emphasis on local environmental context 
as drivers of both these phenomena has emerged. 
Over the last three decades, therefore, renewed 
attention has been paid to ecological theories 
in understanding and explaining the relationship 
between social disorder, processes of change 
within neighbourhoods, and levels of crime. 
Social disorganisation theory has been especially 
prominent, drawing on pioneering work in Chicago by 
Shaw and McKay.4 Simply put, social disorganisation 
refers to ‘the inability of local communities to realize 
the common values of their residents or solve 
commonly experienced problems’.5 In its classic 
formulation, this theoretical perspective examined 
low socioeconomic status, high population turnover 
and ethnic heterogeneity as the dominant factors 
weakening the influence of social rules on the 
behaviour of residents in communities. However, 
new questions have gradually been posed and social 
disorganisation perspectives have expanded to 
include an additional range of structural measures and 
processes, such as social cohesion, informal control, 
social trust, social capital and collective efficacy.6 The 
attention devoted to social disorganisation theory has 
included the influential, though contested, ‘broken 
windows theory’, which maintains that minor signs 
of physical disorder serve as visual cues that lead to 
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serious crime and mounting urban decay, as well as 
subsequent theoretical critiques arguing that other 
factors instrumentally influence crime rates and that 
the disorder-crime link is weakly associated.7     
In this article, our intention within this broader 
theoretical framework is to provide some preliminary 
South African empirical evidence with regard to 
the association between fear of crime and social 
cohesion. While crime represents a central variable 
in social disorganisation theory and is referred to in 
places throughout this article, our research primarily 
focuses on fear of crime rather than the occurrence of 
crime in examining associations with social cohesion. 
Specifically, we analyse nationally representative 
survey data to determine the existence and strength 
of the association between these social indicators. 
For the purposes of this article, analysis has been 
confined exclusively to 2013 South African Social 
Attitudes Survey (SASAS) data, as this is the most 
recent survey round that contains both the fear 
and social cohesion measures that we use, as 
described below. We begin by outlining theoretical 
approaches to examining fear of crime and social 
cohesion, as well as associated empirical evidence. 
We then describe the survey data used for analysis, 
including a discussion of the definitional and 
measurement debates on fear of crime, and present 
the distribution of our chosen fear indicator. We 
also examine the influence of fear on two aspects 
of our multidimensional conceptualisation of social 
cohesion, namely social trust and neighbourhood 
ties, as well as political legitimacy. We conclude 
by relating our findings to theoretical perspectives 
on the consequences of fear in communities, and 
reflecting on the implications for policy efforts aimed 
at addressing crime and fear of crime as the basis for 
greater cohesion and improved personal, community 
and national wellbeing. 
Fear of crime and social 
cohesion in theory
One strand of the social disorganisation literature 
has focused on exploring the complex ways in 
which contextual mechanisms influence crime and 
perceptions of crime within localities. Neighbourhood 
characteristics, such as disadvantage, population 
stability or mobility, level of urbanisation, racial or 
ethnic diversity and prior crime levels are seen to 
shape collective efficacy (social cohesion, trust 
and informal social control) and social disorder, 
which inform beliefs and worries about crime and 
violence.8 One extension of the social disorganisation 
perspective recognises that a reciprocal relationship 
may exist between fear of crime and neighbourhood 
social cohesion. This implies that while the 
characteristics of neighbourhoods are likely to have 
consequences for levels of crime and fear of crime, it 
is also possible that fear of crime may have a bearing 
on neighbourhood trust, cohesion and attachment. 
There are two dominant theoretical perspectives 
pertaining to community responses to fear of crime, 
termed by James Hawdon and colleagues as the 
‘fear-decline’ and ‘fear-solidarity’ models.9 According 
to the fear-decline model, escalating fear of crime can 
weaken the ability of local communities to collectively 
address problems. This occurs because fear inhibits 
social interaction, which, in turn, may result in a 
decline in social cohesion and trust, erode the informal 
social control or collective efficacy that keeps crime 
and disorder in check, and foster a retreat from 
neighbourhood life.10 Consequently, this process of 
decline is thought to further provoke fear and a rise 
in crime. By contrast, the fear-solidarity model argues 
that fear of crime may actually serve to enhance 
community solidarity by motivating residents to 
come together, establish shared values and respond 
collectively to the common threat posed by crime. 
Existing evidence on the 
fear-cohesion association
There have been a number of studies, mostly from 
North America and Europe, that have attempted to 
test the hypothesised effect of fear of crime on 
neighbourhood social ties and attachment. In an early 
Canadian study from the late 1970s, Timothy 
Hartnagel found that fear of victimisation was not 
inversely related to neighbourhood cohesion and 
social activity, but did have a significant effect on 
attachment to the community as a place of 
residence.11 Despite this finding, a number of other 
studies have tended to confirm the view that fear 
promotes decline and withdrawal rather than solidarity. 
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For instance, Allen Liska and Barbara Warner’s 1991 
study of United States (US) cities found that fear of 
crime constrains social interaction, which they contend 
is likely to have a damaging effect on social solidarity 
and attempts at building cohesiveness.12 Similarly, 
using British Crime Survey data, Markowitz and 
colleagues found in 2001 that declining neighbourhood 
cohesion increased crime and disorder, which resulted 
in escalating fear of crime and imposed further 
downward pressure on cohesion.13 A more recent 
example comes from a 2013 Finnish study, where 
Hawdon and colleagues suggest relatively strong 
support for the fear-decline perspective but not for the 
fear-solidarity model.14 In fact, very limited evidence 
exists favouring the solidarity model. One exception is 
the 2009 study of Chicago residents by Joong-Hwan 
Oh and Sangmoon Kim, who found that mounting fear 
of crime among the elderly promoted greater social 
interaction with their neighbours and created the basis 
for stronger social cohesion and interpersonal trust.15 
South African evidence on the fear-cohesion nexus is 
especially limited, particularly if one narrows the focus 
to quantitative studies. There have nonetheless been 
several articles in South Africa testing different aspects 
of social disorganisation theory.16
Methodology
This study employs quantitative data from the 2013 
round of the South African Social Attitudes Survey 
(SASAS), a repeat cross-sectional survey series that 
has been conducted annually since 2003 by the 
Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). Each 
SASAS round has been designed to yield a nationally 
representative sample of adults aged 16 and older 
living in private residence. Statistics South Africa’s 
2011 Population Census Small Area Layers (SALs) 
were used as primary sampling units (PSUs). For 
each round of SASAS, 500 PSUs were drawn, with 
probability proportional to size, from a sampling frame 
containing all of the 2011 SALs. The sampling frame 
is annually updated to coincide with StatsSA’s mid-
year population estimates in respect of the following 
variables: province, gender, population group and age 
group. The sample excludes special institutions (such 
as hospitals, military camps, old age homes, school 
and university hostels), recreational areas, industrial 
areas, and vacant areas. It therefore focuses on 
dwelling units or visiting points as secondary sampling 
units (SSUs), which are separate (non-vacant) residential 
stands, addresses, structures, flats, homesteads and 
other similar structures. Three explicit stratification 
variables were used in selecting SALs, namely province, 
geographic type and majority population group. 
In each of these drawn PSUs, 21 dwelling units were 
selected and systematically grouped into three sub-
samples of seven, each corresponding to the three 
SASAS questionnaire versions that are fielded. The 
questionnaire containing the relevant fear of crime and 
social cohesion was included in only one of the three 
instruments, and thus administered to seven visiting 
points in each PSU.17 The sample size of the study 
consisted of 2 885 interviews. 
The English base version of the research instruments 
was translated into the country’s major official 
languages and the surveys were administered in 
the preferred language of the respondent. This was 
to ensure that all respondents in different provinces 
understood the questionnaire and that it was culturally 
equivalent and consistent across all languages. Pilot 
testing was conducted in an attempt to ensure the 
validity of the research instrument. Interviews were 
conducted by means of face-to-face interviewing, using 
print questionnaires.18  
Study limitations
Two particular limitations of the study need to be 
mentioned. The first relates to the availability of cross-
sectional versus panel data. As previously mentioned, 
SASAS is a repeat, cross-sectional survey series. 
Therefore, while the series permits the analysis of trends 
in underlying beliefs and attitudes over time, it is not 
a longitudinal panel study that interviews the same 
individual respondents at regular intervals. The absence 
of repeated observations for the same sample of South 
African adults over a number of waves of interviewing 
means that the study is constrained in its ability to 
examine the observed relationships between crime, fear 
of crime and social cohesion among the same people. 
The implication is that our focus is instead confined 
to exploring the extent and nature of the association 
between these constructs. 
The second limitation of the study is that, due to 
the sample design and characteristics, the SASAS 
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dataset does not permit disaggregation down to the 
neighbourhood level. As a result, we are unable to 
examine how neighbourhood level characteristics 
may affect crime, fear and social cohesion patterns, 
or reflect on the consistency or variation in observed 
patterns within and between different localities at 
the small area level. While this does mean that we 
are drawing on neighbourhood-level theory to inform 
and guide the national-level analysis we perform, 
we believe that survey results will at least serve as a 
broad evidence of the fear-cohesion nexus that future 
neighbourhood-level, quantitative research could 
substantiate or refute. 
Measuring fear of crime
The steady expansion of research on fear of crime in 
recent years has prompted significant methodological 
reflection on the survey-based measures traditionally 
used to examine this phenomenon. One of the most 
commonly used fear of crime questions asked of 
individuals includes variants on the following: ‘How 
safe do you feel walking alone in this area after dark?’ 
This is the primary indicator included in Statistics 
South Africa’s Victims of Crime Survey series to 
capture fear of crime.19 This line of questioning is 
said to capture ‘formless’ fears that address a vague 
threat to personal security, and can be distinguished 
from measures aimed at identifying ‘concrete’ fears 
that refer to a particular crime (e.g. types of property 
crime or individual/personal crime).20 Criticisms 
levelled at the formless fear questions include:  
•	 The	lack	of	explicit	reference	to	crime
•	 The	imprecise	geographical	reference	–	the	
‘neighbourhood’ or ‘local area’
•	 The	reference	to	an	activity	that	many	may	seldom	
undertake (‘walking alone after dark’), either by 
choice or owing to physical limitation
•	 The	absence	of	a	specific	recall	period	and	failure	
to capture frequency of fearful experiences (e.g. 
number of times in the past year that the person 
felt unsafe)21 
Various refinements have been experimented with 
in response to such criticisms, ranging from basic 
phrasing changes to the inclusion of multiple items. 
Of particular relevance is recent research that 
suggests that fear of crime is both an expressive 
and an experiential phenomenon.22 The expressive 
component of fear refers to ‘a more diffuse/ambient 
anxiety’,23 which is essentially a general awareness 
of the likelihood or risk of victimisation. Alternatively, 
experiential fear can be described as ‘an everyday 
worry’, a set of tangible emotions deriving from a 
feeling that one’s personal safety is being directly 
threatened. The conventional formless fear questions 
arguably tap into more general anxiety or the 
expressive element of fear. They may also overestimate 
fear of crime due to a focus on how afraid one is 
(intensity) without taking account of how often one is 
worried or fearful (frequency) or the impact of such 
worries on everyday life.24  
As such, in this article we draw on measures originally 
developed for inclusion in the European Social Survey 
(ESS) to better capture experiential fear. These 
measures combine items on the frequency of worry 
about specific crime types with questions on the 
adverse impact of fear on quality of life. This narrows 
the focus to emotional experiences that adversely 
affect wellbeing, which may lead to more precise 
estimates of the everyday experience of the fear of 
crime.25 The specific form of these questions is as 
follows:
(1)  ‘How often, if at all, do you worry about your 
home being burgled?’, with the response 
categories ‘All or most of the time’, ‘Some of 
the time’, ‘Just occasionally’ and ‘Never’.
(2)  (If the answer is other than ‘Never’): ‘Does this 
worry about your home being burgled have a 
serious effect on the quality of your life, some 
effect, or no real effect on the quality of your 
life?’
(3) – (4)  Two questions with similar phrasing, though 
‘your home being burgled’ is substituted with 
‘becoming a victim of violent crime’.
These experiential fear measures have been included 
in each round of the SASAS series since 2008, 
alongside the more traditional indicators of fear, 
namely the perceived safety of walking alone in one’s 
areas during the day and after dark.26 In Table 1, the 
frequency of responses to the worry about burglary 
and violent crime questions, as well as the follow-up 
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Table 1: Frequency of responses to four 
 questions on worry about crime (2013)
Worry 
about 
burglary
Worry 
about 
violent 
crime
Frequency of worry
Never 38% 38%
Just occasionally 15% 16%
Some of the time 31% 26%
All/most of the time 17% 21%
Total 100% 100%
Effect of worry on quality of life 
Never worry 38% 38%
No real effect 11% 12%
Some effect 33% 33%
Serious effect 18% 18%
Total 100% 100%
Source: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey 
(SASAS), 2013.
items on the impact of such fear on personal quality 
of life, are presented for the 2013 survey round. 
Close to two-fifths (38%) of adult South Africans 
indicated that they never worried about their home 
being burgled or becoming a victim of violent crime, 
while a slightly higher share expressed worry either 
‘just occasionally’ or ‘some of the time’ (46% for 
burglary; 50% for violent crime). For both types of 
crime, around a fifth of adults indicated that their 
worry was a constant presence in their lives (17% for 
burglary; 21% for violent crime). 
A similar distribution of responses is evident in 
relation to the items addressing the impact of worry 
on one’s quality of life. Of those that expressed some 
level of worry about the two crime types in 2013, only 
around a tenth (11–12%) felt it had ‘no real effect’, 
with a significant proportion (33% for burglary and 
violent crime) acknowledging at least ‘some effect’. 
In Table 2, the cross-tabulation of the frequency of 
worry and effect on quality of life items is presented. 
The results demonstrate a consistent and expected 
pattern, namely that the more frequently one worries 
about crime, the more inclined one is to report 
appreciable effects on quality of life. Those who 
Effect of worry on quality of life
Frequency of worry (Never worry) No real effect Some effect Serious effect Total
Worry about burglary
Never 100 – – – 100
Just occasionally – 42 52 6 100
Some of the time – 16 65 18 100
All or most of the time – 4 37 59 100
Total 38 12 33 18 100
Worry about violent crime
Never 100 – – – 100
Just occasionally – 42 47 11 100
Some of the time – 13 70 17 100
All or most of the time – 5 27 69 100
Total 38 11 33 18 100
Table 2: Estimated proportions of different effects on quality of life given frequency of worry about crime 
 (2013, row percentages)
Source: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2013.
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indicated that they worried ‘just occasionally’ mostly 
reported that it had ‘some effect’ (52% for burglary; 
47% for violent crime). Among those stating that 
they worried ‘some of the time’, a far greater share 
stated that it had ‘some effect’ on their quality of 
life (65% for burglary; 70% for violent crime). Finally, 
for those worrying ‘all or most of the time’, the 
dominant response was that this exerted a ‘serious 
effect’ on their wellbeing (59% for burglary; 69% for 
violent crime). These patterns have exhibited modest 
fluctuations between 2008 and 2014 (results not 
shown), but the overarching pattern is one of broadly 
consistent levels of worry which, for a sizable minority, 
has a serious impact on the quality of their lives.27 
The responses to the four questions were combined 
into a single categorical measure of fear of crime, 
using an approach that Jackson and Kuha refer to 
as a ‘model-supported method’.28 The scaling of 
this measure ranged from 1 (unworried) to 6 (most 
worried). The responses for 2013 are provided in Table 
3.29 On average across the period, slightly more than a 
third (36%) of respondents were unworried, while 13% 
worried occasionally only about home burglary or only 
about violent crime. A quarter of the adult population 
(23%) displayed moderate levels of worry, 5% had a 
fairly high level, while 23% were classified as having 
very high levels of worry. Year-on-year estimates show 
a similar pattern, though with some differences at the 
tail ends of the distribution.
The experience of criminal victimisation has a clear 
bearing on levels of fear. In 2013, SASAS respondents 
were asked: ‘Have you or a member of your household 
been the victim of a burglary or assault in the last five 
years?’ Of those who answered affirmatively,30 almost 
two-fifths (37%) were found to be in class 6 (most 
worried) and only about one-seventh (15%) were in 
the first class (least worried). Further testing found that 
fear was lower among those who had not been victims 
of crime.31 A Pearson’s chi-squared test identified 
that the observed differences between fear of crime 
and experience of crime were statistically significant, 
as did a one-way ANOVA test.32 This suggests that, 
in South Africa, an individual’s fear of crime has a 
relationship with his or her experience of crime. Yet it 
is also possible for fear of crime to be disproportionate 
relative to the actual risk of criminal victimisation. For 
instance, the city of Barcelona (Spain) has a low and 
declining crime rate, but fear of crime in Barcelona 
remains high, indicating a mismatch between actual 
levels of victimisation and the fear of being victimised.33 
In such instances, fear may reflect a more generalised 
sense of risk.34 It must be considered, therefore, that 
the relationship between fear of crime and criminal 
victimisation can be complex and non-linear.
A multidimensional approach  
Like fear of crime, social cohesion has received 
increased policy attention in South Africa over the 
last decade, especially following the widespread 
xenophobic violence of 2008. It has been promoted to 
address concerns related to the high levels of violent 
crime, but also to promote positive national identity in a 
multicultural, stratified society.35 The 1998 White Paper 
on Safety and Security identified the promotion of 
social cohesion as an important element underlying its 
social crime prevention efforts. More recently, the 2012 
National Development Plan (NDP) included a chapter 
entitled ‘Building safer communities’, which among 
other things stressed that safety and security requires 
an environment that is conducive to ‘strengthened 
social cohesion’. Even the 2015 draft White Paper on 
Security and Safety includes the need ‘to improve the 
Table 3: Levels of fear of crime in South Africa in 
 2013 based on the new categorisation 
2013 (%)
95% confidence 
intervals
Lower 
bound
Upper 
bound
Unworried 39 35.1 42.2
Burglary only 6 4.5 7.1
Violent crime only 8 6,.0 9.3
Infrequent worry 22 19.3 24.5
Frequent worry 6 4.7 7.8
Persistent worry 20 18.0 23.2
Total 100
Mean score (1-6) 3.12 2.99 3.26
Data: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), 
Round 11, 2013. Weighted percentages have been 
calculated using sampling design weights, benchmarked to 
Statistics South Africa’s mid-year population estimates. The 
total number of respondents with valid responses to the 
fear of crime measures is 2 845. 
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social fabric and cohesion within families’ as one of 
six core objectives. Institutionally, a Chief Directorate 
of Social Cohesion has been established in the 
Department of Arts and Culture to coordinate social 
cohesion activities across government departments. 
Yet, despite this, social cohesion has been, and 
continues to be, the subject of considerable 
conceptual and measurement debate. There remains 
little agreement on what constitutes social cohesion 
and whether or how it can be measured.36  
In this instance, we draw on research conducted 
by the HSRC on conceptualising and measuring 
social cohesion. This conceptual framework 
assumes that social cohesion is multidimensional 
in that it encompasses a number of domains of 
social life, involves both attitudinal and behavioural 
predispositions, and is an attribute of a group or 
society rather than individuals.37 The HSRC work 
identified three specific dimensions of cohesion: 
•	Socio-cultural cohesion, which includes social 
capital, trust, tolerance and shared identities and is 
the core focus in much social cohesion literature 
•	Economic cohesion, which addresses economic 
development as well as support for strategies to 
reduce poverty and inequality 
•	Civic cohesion, which addresses political 
support and legitimacy as well as active political 
participation by citizens 
A full examination of the association between fear 
of crime and social cohesion, using a range of 
measures to inform this particular conceptualisation, 
is beyond the scope of this short article. Instead, we 
focus on two key aspects of socio-cultural and civic 
cohesion, the first relating to interpersonal or social 
trust and neighbourliness, and the second focusing 
on key components of political support. Use will be 
made exclusively of the 2013 SASAS data, as this is 
the most recent round that contains both the fear and 
social cohesion measures. 
Results
Does fear diminish social trust?  
Despite common references to the ‘rainbow nation’ 
and the moral philosophy of ubuntu, national and 
comparative data on social trust suggest that South 
Africa is a society characterised by low levels of trust.38 
Given criticism concerning the reliability of single-item 
measures of generalised interpersonal trust, we make 
use of three items included in SASAS.39 The measures 
are phrased as follows: (1) ‘Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted, or that you 
cannot be too careful in dealing with people?’;  (2) ‘Do 
you think that most people would try to take advantage 
of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be 
fair?’; and (3) ‘Would you say that most of the time 
people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking 
out for themselves?’.40 Responses to these items are 
captured on an 11-point scale, where 0 represents 
the lowest level of trust and 10 the highest.41 Again, 
relatively low levels of trust are evident, with the mean 
scores ranging between 4.02 and 4.40 on the scale. 
The scores for the three items were subsequently 
averaged together and the resultant 0–10 score 
transformed into a 0–100 trust index, with higher 
values indicating greater trust in others.42
In Figure 1, mean social trust index scores are 
presented for each of the six categories in the 
experiential fear of crime measure. The results do 
not reveal a stark gradient of difference across the 
Figure 1: Mean social trust index scores by  
 experiential fear of crime, 2013
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engagement in decision-making processes and 
efforts at improving government transparency and 
accountability. 
To examine the consequence of fear of crime on 
civic cohesion, we examine measures that allow 
us to discern patterns of political legitimacy and 
illegitimacy. We draw on a nested understanding of 
political support, ranging from diffuse measures of 
national identity and pride through to more specific 
evaluations of democratic performance, institutional 
trust, and approval of office-bearers.48 For the 
purposes of this article, we leave aside the political 
participation element of civic cohesion. Future studies 
will hopefully explore the impact of fear of crime on 
political behaviour in the country. National pride is 
assessed based on the level of agreement with the 
following statement: ‘Generally speaking, South 
Africa is a better country than most other countries.’ 
Two measures of democratic performance are used, 
namely satisfaction with the functioning of democracy 
as a whole and, more narrowly, satisfaction with the 
way that the government is handling crime reduction 
in one’s neighbourhood. With regard to institutional 
trust, we focus on trust in the police and the courts, 
while the last measure we employ for our analysis is 
trust in current political leaders in the country. In all 
instances, a standard five-point Likert scale is used 
to capture responses. 
Table 4 presents levels of pride, satisfaction and trust 
for each of these political support measures and how 
these attitudes vary by different levels of experiential 
fear. It is interesting to observe from the bottom row 
in the table that, after two decades of democracy, 
South Africans are resolutely proud of their country, 
but judge fairly harshly the general performance of 
the democratic system and the quality of political 
leadership. Citizens also lack confidence in the 
police and courts, while less than a fifth (18%) were 
content with government crime reduction efforts in 
their neighbourhood. Observed levels of discontent 
in 2013 in many instances reflect a general decline 
in political support over the 2008–2014 interval.49 
Unfavourable evaluations of the performance of 
democracy and core political institutions could 
be interpreted as a sign of the emergence of a 
more critical citizen who is concerned with the 
accountability of institutions and office-bearers. 
fear scale. A one-way ANOVA was conducted and 
revealed that fear of crime did exert a significant effect 
on social trust [M=42.2, SD=21.4, F(5,2817)=6.55, p 
< .001].43 However, post hoc comparisons using the 
Scheffé test show that only those in the most worried 
category are less trusting than those with lower levels 
of fear,44 while correlation analysis shows that there 
is only a weak, inverse relationship between fear and 
trust (r = -0.047, p = 0.0134). 
These results suggest that fear of crime is 
inversely related to social trust, but it needs to be 
acknowledged that the levels of fear need to be 
relatively high in order for this association to be 
observed. Similar findings emerge when using 
measures of neighbourliness rather than social trust.45 
We also find that the conclusions do not alter if 
one substitutes the experiential fear variable for the 
conventional ‘walking alone at night’ fear measure.46 
Such findings indicate that fear of crime exerts a 
nominal negative influence over social trust and 
community ties, which is most evident at the upper 
margin of the fear scales. One might take this finding 
as evidence that South Africans are resilient and do 
not allow fear of crime to depress their levels of social 
trust or damage neighbourly bonds. However, given 
the low general trust scores, one could also argue 
that such trust and community ties may to some 
degree already have eroded and that expectations 
of a strong pattern of difference, based on such 
measures, are possibly misplaced. 
The political consequences of fear 
The process of democratic transformation and 
consolidation in the country has focused on 
progressively realising a united, cohesive society. The 
NDP emphasises political legitimacy and democratic 
participation as primary goals of the state and core 
indicators of social cohesion. The importance of civic 
cohesion derives from mounting international concern 
over the last two decades about an apparent erosion 
of the foundations of citizenship and democracy, or a 
‘crisis of democratic legitimacy’. Evidence of declining 
electoral turnout, falling confidence in government 
and mounting public discontent are often cited in 
support of this thesis.47 It has provoked wide-ranging 
initiatives aimed at building up citizen-state relations, 
including opening up opportunities for direct citizen 
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Does fear have a discernible impact 
on these measures? 
The evidence presented in Table 4 shows that the 
results are rather mixed. An association between fear 
of crime and national pride is clearly not manifest. 
The same appears to be true of satisfaction with 
democratic performance and the country’s current 
political leaders. As can be observed from the table 
and as one might intuitively expect, there is a slightly 
stronger but nonetheless moderate inverse association 
between fear and both trust in the police and 
satisfaction with crime reduction. Further examination, 
using single pairwise correlations, shows a negative 
association between fear of crime and confidence 
in the police and in crime-reduction efforts.50 In 
other words, as an individual becomes more fearful, 
his or her confidence in the criminal justice system 
declines. While worry about crime therefore has some 
association with more specific political support items, 
on the whole it is unlikely to be a primary driver of 
political legitimacy in the country, given the strength 
and nature of the observed association. 
Conclusion
In South Africa, fear of crime continues to be reported 
by a significant share of the population, irrespective 
of whether expressive or experiential measures are 
employed. Reported fear of crime is no doubt informed 
by experiences of crime, and a significant segment 
of the adult population reported having been a victim 
of crime in last five years. While much concern has 
been voiced about the likely consequences such fear 
may bring to bear on local society, the study results 
offer fairly circumscribed support for a corrosive effect 
on the particular aspects of social cohesion that we 
examined. There is only a weak, negative association 
with social trust and neighbourhood ties. Greater 
fear is associated with more negative views of police 
effectiveness and overall police confidence. Yet it 
does not yield a consistent, adverse association with 
more diffuse measures of political support, such as 
satisfaction with democracy and national pride. Where 
such a relationship exists, it tends to be apparent 
only at the extreme, upper margins of the fear scale. 
Therefore these results certainly do not provide 
unequivocal evidence in favour of either fear-decline or 
fear-solidarity models of community responses to fear. 
At best, they show marginal and somewhat variable 
support for the fear-decline perspective. 
Obviously, the study is constrained by the data 
available for analysis. Longitudinal data would 
allow us to better understand the direction of the 
relationship observed in this study. As Markowitz 
observes, the absence of such panel data has 
been a general impediment in social disorganisation 
National 
pride
Satisfaction 
with 
democracy
Trust in 
political 
leaders
Trust in 
courts
Trust in 
police
Satisfaction 
with crime
reduction
Unworried 82 33 28 48 36 24
Burglary only 76 40 34 65 30 24
Violent crime only 69 36 29 50 27 21
Infrequent worry 81 31 25 44 21 13
Frequent worry 86 46 29 41 26 16
Persistent worry 76 27 26 35 22 12
National average 79 33 27 45 28 18
Table 4: Relationship between fear (and experience) of crime and civic cohesion
Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2013.
Note: The first column showcases the share of the population who agree that South Africa is a better country than most other 
countries; columns two and three reflect the adult public who are satisfied with democracy and political leaders; the fourth 
and fifth columns reflect the share who trust in the courts and the police respectively; and finally the sixth column depicts the 
proportion of the population that is satisfied with the government’s crime-cutting efforts in their neighbourhood. 
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research, which has mostly relied on cross-sectional 
data. Moreover, there is a need for data that 
would allow neighbourhood-level disaggregation, 
permitting researchers to test the paradigms of social 
disorganisation theory in South Africa, especially in 
teasing out the nature of the relationship between 
social cohesion, fear of crime, and crime. 
Further work will need to be undertaken to 
determine the replicability of our findings, by 
experimenting with alternate measures of both fear 
and cohesion. Since we focused on national patterns, 
the consistency of our findings across different 
groups, geographies and individual and community 
attributes will need to be explored. If our findings are, 
however, replicated through other studies it would 
suggest that success in efforts at reducing crime 
and the fear of crime are unlikely to translate into 
immediate and substantive gains in terms of positive 
forms of neighbourhood cohesion. 
Furthermore, the fact that low levels of social trust, 
trust in the police and courts, as well as satisfaction 
with democratic functioning are common to both 
the fearful and fearless raises fundamental questions 
about the nature of the social fabric and community in 
the country. Perhaps, as Suren Pillay contends, we are 
a nation where such attitudinal predispositions may 
have encouraged tendencies towards ‘fragmentation 
rather than unification’.51 This is apparent in the 
proliferation of gated communities, the growing 
reliance on non-state forms of policing, calls for 
retributive justice, and the rise of forms of cohesion 
that target perceived external threats (such as foreign 
migrants) and nurture out-group hostility. While more 
needs to be done to ensure freedom from crime and 
the fear of crime, we must be careful in assuming that 
this would serve as a catalyst for more multicultural, 
bridging forms of cohesion as desired by the 
government’s nation-building programme. 
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